Fear manufactured by exclusive worldviews in the Western world leads to distorted readings on new religious movements in the Muslim world, contributing to both narrow US domestic as well as foreign policymaking. For nearly four decades, US policymakers on occasion have compromised the US Establishment Clause to accommodate Judeo-Christian interest

A New Era of Postsecularism
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century, American foreign policy shifted from containing Communism to spreading US primacy throughout parts of the Arab and Muslim world, with an emphasis on securing Western energy interests. Washington has not registered that the United States has entered a postsecular era-a period where the presence of religion in global politics is unprecedented. This period is marked by what German social theorist Jürgen Habermas regards as a time where "religion is holding its own in an increasingly secular environment and that society must assume that religious fellowships will continue to exist for the foreseeable future."
1 Among the new challenges confronting state-nonstate actor engagement are a set of preconceived notions formed by state actors within liberal secular societies about non-Western societies and their religious systems. As this chapter will indicate, a new type of frustration is growing, linked particularly to the inability of Western state actors to practice religious tolerance or to accommodate emerging perspectives held by nonstate actors in the Muslim world.
The highly regarded secularization thesis, held by nineteenth-and twentieth-century sociologists and philosophers, puts forward the view that a rise in science, technology, and urbanization would engender a decline in the practice and importance of religion in society. Assertions by C. Wright Mills that "in due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly in the private realm," and the allied beliefs held by seminal thinkers like Emile Durkheim, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud "that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society," 2 were an exaggerated misreading of the impact that secularization would soon have on the practice of religion the world over. By the mid-twentieth century, the secularization thesis fell on deaf ears due, to a large extent, to the new reality that science and technology contributed to new sophisticated wars, underpinned by competing religious and cultural ideals. What was apparent, but less often explored by Western scholars, were the socioreligious realities that had existed for centuries in non-Western societies. While the concept of secularism did not exist in non-Western countries, both religion and traditional practices have been intertwined with the political, economic, and social infrastructure of most Asian and African societies. Thus, in these societies, the global public practice of religion has yet to enter a period of retreat, or show signs of decline due to Europe's industrial progress.
The decline or disappearance of religion from public space is regarded as "secularization," a term that has taken on numerous meanings.
3 Max Weber acknowledged secularization as "disenchantment" with religion, suggesting, "The fate of our time is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by disenchantment of the world." 4 The world, as Weber observed, was destined to become more
